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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

S'TAT'E. OF UTAH
'TERNE J. OBERHANSL Y,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

TRAVELERS INSlTRANCE COl\IP ANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

REPI.JY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appellant considers it advisable to file a reply brief
in answer to respondent's brief on Point Two in which
the trial court found "that insured did not fail to
cooperate "\\,.ith the defendant insurance company nor did
he fail to rornply with the terms of said insur.ance contract."
Since the preparation of our original brief our attention is called to a case just recently published:
Penn Insurance Company vs. Horner 281 SW
2nd 44
The facts are Penn Insurance Company issued its comprehensive public liability policy to one Horner. He was
driving his insured car. Kerr, a postal employee parked
a government owned mail truck near the curb. He was
sorting mail in the truck. Horner struck the truck a

•
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glancing blo"r and then failed to·:s.top. His· identity·was·
later discovered and he was .charged with hit and run
driving, whereupon Horner fearing federal prosecution;
signed a statement admitting, liability and agreeing to
pay the damage to the truck. About. five months after
the accident Kerr filed suit against Horner claiming
he sustained personal injuries. The insurance company
was not advised of the accident until the suit was filed,
whereupon it began an investigation under a reserv.ation of rights agreement. After doing so, the insurance
company filed suit for a declaratory judgment claiming
the policy void for failure to notify the company of the
accident and for failure to cooperate as required by the
policy. The Chancellor found in favor of the insurance
company. The court of appeals found that the company
was not prejudiced by the failure to give notice. On
· appeal the Supreme Court of Tennessee stated the
. ·,; .:. question-. was . wh~er failure of· insuror to notify
the company.· arid ·his admission of liability relieved the
Jinsu:ta·nce ·con1pany of. liability under the ter1ns of its
.:\ ~--·. J>oliC.y-. :; The:::.court says : .
"A provision requiring assistance and co.-:, •...... operation· is a condition precedent, failure to per•:.
..· . form which in the absence of waiver or estoppel
· · constitutes a defense on the policy."
. ~ . · ·'The.·:_ appellant court reversed the court of appeals and
affirmed the Chancellor.
.

Counsel for respondent contends:r· thaf· the· ~question
.:. ·of diligence and good f.aith on the part ·.of the· insured
is somehow tied into the question of-lack of ;cooperation
and that when the court made a. Sin1ple finding_· that
2
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"the insured :did· :not· fail to cooperate with the
defendant insur~nce, ,company, nor did he fail to
. comply with the terms of said i;ry.surance contract"
•

•

•

;'

I'

I

that there , is. i~mpl~cit .i.n ... this finding the question of
whether or not the.. :ins:nrance. co:q1pany exercised good
faith and due diligence.. in its dealings. 'Yith the insured.
We question the accuracy o~ th~s statement. The finding is directed solely and wholly to the i;nsured and
nothing is said about the insuror. H.ad the court believed
from the evidence that the insuror was lacking in good
faith or diligence, it would of necessity of had to find
such to he the case and the failure so to find renders
that subject moot and leaves for consideration the
only question as to whether or not the insured under
the ad1nitted facts in this case breached the terms and
provisions of the policy.
If we are in error in our position we nevertheless
state emphatically that the evidence in this case shows
a deliberate intent on the part of the insured, from .
the time he left the State of Utah knowing .that . a.:s~it
was pending, to conceal his whereabouts and to refuse
any further cooperation is clearly and conclusively
established. When he left the State of Utah knowing
that this suit had been filed against him, he not only
failed to notify t~e company of his changed addres.s · ·
but attempted to conceal the same by going so far as to
pledge his own a~t~.rney not to reveal to anyone his
whereabouts. When::.·: the attorney for the defendant
. finally learned his ~4dress and sent him the registered
~le.~t~~r: ~opi~d 1n our. ppen1ng brief, he did not answer
3
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the same. He merely contented himself with telephoning
his father and telling him to tell Young that he would
not appear because of his job. After that, both his
father and his attorney requested him to appear at the
trial. He did not reply to his attorney's letter nor did
he write the company or its attorney explaining his position or advising why he could not come. It would have
been an easy matter for him to have written the company or its attorney explaining his situation. In fact
it must be remembered that the insured at no time after
receiving the letter from defendant's attorney and later
his own attorney ever advised assured directly that he
would not appear for the trial on the date set.
The insured claims that at the tin1e of the trial he
was in line for a promotion and bec.ause of this fact it
\Vas diffieult for him to leave his work. He does not
contend that he ever cormnunicated this fact to the company or its attorney. He rnerely told his father to tell
Young he would not come because of his work. Had he
in good faith wanted to appear, it would have been a
very simple rnatter for hin1 to have written explaining
the fact that he was expecting a promotion; that if a
continuance could be had that he would come at. a later.
date. The attorneys for the defendant might then have
been in a position to ask for a continuance, but his only
eomment eonveyed through his father was that he wouldn't appear, not that he would appear at some future time.
We have read the cases cited by respondent and most
of these cases deal with a situation where the insured was
not notified of the date of trial and the question would
4
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naturally· arise .as to whether or not the insured had
~xercised due· diligence . in attempting to locate him.
H0wever, that is not this case. In this case the assured
admits that he, re.ceived the notice of the date of trial
byLregistered letter.' He .admits that he never attempted
to-.contact either :the insurance comp'~Y or its attorney.
He was- advised of the necessity .for his appearance in
court and the consequences: .which would _re~ult if he
failed to attend, yet in -the face of th~s he made no effort whatsoever to cooperate either in procuring a continuance or in attending the trial. vVhile nothing was
s.aid in the first letter concerning expenses, he v1as told
by his own attorney that he was sure the company would
take care of this matter but this is immaterial anyway
because in his deposition the assured states that that
was not the reason he did not appe;ar. In other words,
he would not have come had his expenses been tendered
him.
... Counsel talks about the necessity for the insurance
company to act in good faith. We agree. We say that
the. ins:q.r~nce company at all times acted in the utmost
good faith.· .If~ a request by the company through its
attorney, the request of his own father and of his own
attorney. would· not bring him here, we know of no
~ther efforts which could. have produced the desired re·sult..
The policy does not require the insured to force
.the insuror to attend hearings. The promise is that of
the ins-ured that when reqnested he will attend. Counsel
quotes copiou~ly .from the ~~se _of_,_

5
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Strode vs. Commercial C.asualty Insurance
Comp.any 102 Fed. Supp. 240
wherein the court makes reference to the apparent desire of the insurance company to avoid the policy. Howeve-r, on appeal to the Circuit ~Jourt, 202 Fed. 2nd., 599,
the court affirmed the decision on the sole grounds that
"from a consideration of the entire record in
the cause it is the opinion of this court that Mrs.
Campbell was not given reasonably timely notice
of the trial date, assuming that she received
any notice after the case had been set for trial
some ten days previously with the approval of
the attorney for the appellant."
The court, however, states that all references to the
insurance company only looking for an excuse to abandon
its insurance case and made no effort to take any step
for the benefit of the defendant's insured was not supported by the evidence. However, that might be, in this
case the insuror not only did not .abandon the case but,
recognizing its responsibility, it represented the defendant under a reservation of rights agreement to the very
best of its ability without aid of the defendant.
Respectfully submitted,

YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN
Attorneys for Defendant and .Appellant
1018 First Security Bank Building
Ogden, Utah
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